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Summary10
1. A useful interpretation of quantitative genetic models of evolutionary
change is that they a) define a set of phenotypes that have a causal effect12
on fitness and on which selection acts, and b) define a set of breeding
values that change as a correlated response to that selection because they14
covary with the phenotypes.
2. When the expression of one trait causes variation in other traits then there16
are multiple paths by which a trait can cause fitness variation. Because
of this there are multiple ways in which selection can be defined, and still18
be consistent with a causal effect of traits on fitness.
3. We use this result to show that genetical theories of natural/kin selection20
ignore causation and because of this we suggest they shed little light on
the nature of selection.22
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4. When traits expressed by an individual are affected by traits of their social
partners (indirect genetic effects), we suggest a causal partitioning that24
allows selection to be cast in terms of Hamilton’s costs and benefits.
5. We show that previous attempts to understand Hamilton’s rule in the con-26
text of indirect genetic effects either lack generality, or do not adequately
describe all the ways in which an individual’s actions constitute a cost to28
the individual or a benefit to its social partner(s).
6. Our results allow us to explore Hamilton’s rule in a multitrait setting.30
We show that evolution always increases inclusive fitness, and when the
traits are measured in units of generalised genetic distance evolutionary32
change in the traits is in the direction in which inclusive fitness increases
the fastest.34
7. However, we show that Hamilton’s rule only holds in a multitrait context
when the suite of traits are at equilibrium. When they are out of equilib-36
rium, the conditions for altruism to evolve may be more or less stringent
depending on genetic architecture and how costs and benefits are defined.38
Introduction
40
Kin selection models and the concept of inclusive fitness are important tools
for studying the evolution of traits involved in social interactions (Hamilton,42
1964a,b). Indirect genetic effect (IGE) models were developed in animal and
plant breeding to meet the same need, but prior to, and in isolation from,44
Hamilton’s work (Griffing, 1967; Willham, 1963, 1972). Their key feature is that
the trait values of an actor can determine the trait values of a recipient, and46
therefore affect the recipient’s fitness in two ways: directly, or indirectly via their
effect on the recipient’s own traits (Moore et al., 1997; Wolf et al., 1999). Since48
these models have been introduced into evolutionary biology there have been
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several attempts to relate the parameters of IGE models to the components of50
inclusive fitness, and therefore Hamilton’s rule (Cheverud, 1984; Bijma & Wade,
2008; McGlothlin et al., 2010; Gardner et al., 2011; Hadfield, 2012; McGlothlin52
et al., 2014).
McGlothlin et al. (2014) acknowledged (and added to) the profusion of IGE54
Hamilton’s rules, and concluded that because they are all decompositions of
the same evolutionary equation they all offer equally valid perspectives; any56
differences are merely a matter of semantics. Similar conclusions have been
reached by other authors regarding the alternative statistical partitions of total58
selection that give rise to group-selection and kin-selection approaches (Frank,
1998; Marshall, 2011). However, Okasha (2016) has recently argued that from60
a causal perspective kin and group selection are not equivalent processes, and
that the correct partition separates the causal effects of phenotypes on individual62
fitness from those on group fitness.
Here we try to understand natural selection in IGE, and other quantitative64
genetic models, from a causal perspective. Much ground work has already been
done in this respect using path-analytic techniques (Arnold, 1983; Conner, 1996;66
Scheiner et al., 2000; Morrissey, 2014), but to our knowledge it has not been done
explicitly in the context of IGEs. From a causal perspective we believe that there68
is one type of partition that is consistent with Hamilton’s idea, or at least most
biologist’s understanding of it (Okasha & Martens, 2016); the partition should70
allow the benefit to be the causal effect of the actor’s actions on the recipient’s
fitness and the cost to be the causal effect of the actor’s actions on the actor’s72
own fitness (Grafen, 1982). We derive a general method for obtaining such a
partition in IGE models and show that the resulting partition will generally74
differ from those developed earlier (McGlothlin et al., 2014). Maternal effect
models are one of the most commonly employed IGE models and several authors76
have previously sought to understand them in the context of Hamilton’s rule
(e.g. Cheverud, 1984; Hadfield, 2012). However, the cross-generational nature of78
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maternal effects greatly complicates their interpretation, leading some to exclude
them from the class of models to which their results apply (McGlothlin et al.,80
2014). We show when and why maternal effect models are hard to understand
in terms of cost and benefit, and show that the causal partition we present holds82
in all instances.
Kin selection and IGE models have usually been constructed for single traits.84
When thinking about multiple traits, the Lande (1979) equation fundamentally
changed the way evolutionary quantitative geneticists think about phenotypic86
selection and the response to that selection. Characterising selection in terms
of partial derivatives placed selection more firmly in the realm of cause and88
effect (Grafen, 1988; Frank, 1997), and paved the way for the use of multiple
regression as an empirical tool that facilitates a greater understanding about90
the causes of fitness variation from correlational data (Lande & Arnold, 1983).
In addition, expressing how the response to this selection is warped by genetic92
correlations between traits using a compact matrix notation, provided a clear
way of understanding and visualising the evolution of multiple traits (Phillips94
& Arnold, 1989; Schluter, 1996). Although IGE models have often been devel-
oped using multivariate notation, when interpreted in the context of Hamilton’s96
rule only single trait (McGlothlin et al., 2010, 2014), or special case two-trait
models (Cheverud, 1984; Hadfield, 2012), have been analysed. Here we explore98
the conditions under which altruism evolves when multiple traits are involved
in social interactions, and the consequences this has for inclusive fitness. We100
find that Hamilton’s single trait rule breaks down when there are multiple traits
(Cheverud, 1984), much as the breeder’s equation does in standard quantitative102
genetic models (Lande, 1979).
104
Methods and Results
106
In this section we present the methods and results together, along with how
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they connect with previous theory. Our main result is a multitrait version108
of Hamilton’s rule that incorporates IGEs (Sections 5 & 6), but to obtain it
various intermediate results need to be derived and clarified. Given the length110
and complexity of the section we start with a road map. In section 1) we re-
express the Lande Equation in a way that emphasises its causal and correlational112
components, and in a way that reveals the generality of its basic logic. In
section 2) we show that the suite of traits under selection can be transformed114
without altering the predicted evolutionary response, but only some transforms
retain the notion that the traits causally affect fitness. There is not a unique116
transform that satisfies this because their are multiple ways of defining causality
in a multivariate system. In section 3) we introduce the coefficient matrix of118
a causal system (Ψ) and explore its structure in a range of social and non-
social settings. In section 4) we show that path analytic approaches to natural120
selection (Arnold, 1983) use Ψ to define how traits cause fitness variation that is
distinct from how it is usually defined (Morrissey, 2014) and use it to reveal the122
causal logic of genetical theories of selection (Robertson, 1966; Queller, 1992).
In section 5) we apply these results to social systems in order to define the cost124
as the causal effect of the actors behaviour on its own fitness and the benefit as
the causal effect of the actors behaviour on the fitness of the recipient. We then126
compare this to previous IGE definitions of cost and benefit. In section 6) we
explore the consequences of moving from a single trait to a multitrait system128
for Hamilton’s rule and the evolution of inclusive fitness. The derivation of the
less intuitive results are provided in the Appendix.130
1) Evolution as a correlated response in breeding value to selection on
phenotype132
The Lande (1979) Equation is usually expressed as
∆a = Gβz (1)
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where the between-generation change in breeding values (∆a) for a suite of134
traits (z) is the product of the variance-covariance matrix of breeding values
(G) and the selection gradient (βz). Expressing selection through the selection136
gradient was a major innovation, and connects the theory of selection with the
fact that Darwinian explanations are causal (Okasha, 2006): βz is defined as138
E[∂w/∂z], the average effect of perturbing a trait on relative fitness (w) whilst
holding all other traits constant.140
An alternative, and more general, way of expressing this equation is:
∆a = COV(a, z>)βz (2)
where COV(a, z>) is the covariance between the trait breeding values and142
phenotypes (Kirkpatrick & Lande, 1989; Moore et al., 1997), where > denotes
matrix transpose. This formulation has three benefits. First, it shows that we144
can usefully think of the change in breeding value as a correlated response to se-
lection on phenotype. Second, it also makes it clear that the Lande Equation is a146
special case. Only when inheritance patterns are simple does COV(a, z>) = G,
and different expressions must be sought when there are additional complica-148
tions, such as maternal effects (Kirkpatrick & Lande, 1989) or IGEs generally
(Moore et al., 1997). Finally, it makes clear that the traits in which we are try-150
ing to predict evolutionary change don’t necessarily have to be the same traits
that define selection: the vector of breeding values (a) don’t have to be for the152
same traits (z) that selection acts upon. For example, Kirkpatrick & Lande
(1989) derived a very general maternal effect model (henceforth the K-L model)154
where z are the traits of the individual and also the individual’s mother such
that COV(a, z>) is not a square matrix (as in neighbourhood models (Nun-156
ney, 1985) and the closely related contextual analysis (Heisler & Damuth, 1987;
Goodnight et al., 1992)). To emphasise this we will use a(I) to denote the vector158
of breeding values for the focal individual for which fitness is defined:
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160
∆a(I) = COV(a(I), z>)βz (3)
2) Evolution and selection when trait values are subject to a linear transform
Traits that cause fitness variation are often transformed prior to analysis, and162
so we first note the rather abstract result that any full-rank linear transformation
of the traits that cause fitness variation z˜ = Λz gives identical evolutionary164
dynamics:
COV(a(I), z˜>)βz˜ = COV(a(I), z>)Λ>Λ−>βz = COV(a(I), z>)βz = ∆a(I) (4)
In the Lande Equation and the K-L model the identity transform is used:166
Λ = I. Other transforms have been used, but then the selection vector (βz˜)
is often hard to interpret in terms of the original traits causing fitness varia-168
tion. Notable examples of such ‘non-causal’ transforms are the eigenvectors of
G (Blows et al., 2004) and the non-negative square root of G (Lande, 1979).170
Some transforms retain the interpretation of causality and merely change the
scale on which the traits are measured: for example when Λ is diagonal and172
contains the reciprocal of the trait means or trait standard deviations (Hansen
& Houle, 2008).174
However, there are a set of non-diagonal transforms (i.e. those that don’t176
merely change the scale on which the traits are measured) that do retain the
interpretation that the traits causally effect fitness, and different transforms178
reflect different choices about how we partition the causal graph. To understand
this, imagine the scenario where trait k affects trait l which affects fitness, so we180
have the causal graph k → l→ w(I). We could imagine two experiments, one in
which we simply perturb k and look at the effect on fitness, and one in which we182
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look at the effects on fitness if we perturb k but somehow ensure that l remains
unperturbed. In the first case we would see an effect on fitness, in the second184
we would not: k does not affect fitness conditional on l. The question then is
which experiment should we envisage when we want to understand selection?186
In many cases the choice is entirely dependent on the interests of the researcher:
both experiments are revealing and interesting. However, in the case of social188
evolution - for example when trait k in a social partner affects trait l in a focal
individual which then affects the focal individual’s fitness (k(S) → l(I) → w(I))190
- we believe that the first experiment is the one that best captures the notion of
benefit in Hamilton’s rule: the second experiment would lead to the conclusion192
that the actions of the social partner can have no benefit for the focal individual.
Below, we show how transforms can be constructed which allow us to state which194
traits should remain constant, and which should be allowed to vary, when we
perturb a single trait in an (hypothetical) experiment. These results allow us196
to generalise our intuition about the simple example introduced above to more
complicated situations where there are more traits, and more complex causal198
relationships between them.
3) Trait determination as an intra- and inter-individual linear system200
In what follows we will assume that the set of phenotypes that could have a
causal effect on an individual’s fitness are an individual’s own traits (z(I)) and202
the traits of its social partners (z(S)) such that:
z =
 z(I)
z(S)
 (5)
We will use the matrix Ψ to capture the effects of the phenotypes on each204
other such that ψi,j is the effect of phenotype j on phenotype i. To allow the
notation to accommodate social situations we can partition Ψ into quadrants206
representing the effects of the focal individual’s traits on its own traits (top left)
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the effects of the focal individual’s traits on the social partners’ traits (bottom208
left) the effects of the social partners’ traits on the focal individual’s traits (top
right) and the effects of the social partners’ traits on social partners’ traits210
(bottom right):
Ψ =
 Ψ(I) Ψ(I,S)
Ψ(S,I) Ψ(S)
 (6)
In the first example given above where trait k affects trait l and both are212
measured in the same individual, there are no social partners so:
Ψ = Ψ(I) =
 0 0
ψl,k 0
 (7)
Morrissey (2014) considers this scenario and denotes Ψ(I) as b. In the214
context of a 2-player game where individuals interact symmetrically then:
Ψ =
 0 Ψ(I,S)
Ψ(S,I) 0
 (8)
where Ψ(I,S) = Ψ(S,I). Here, ψ
(I,S)
l,k represents the effect of trait k in the216
social partner on trait l in the focal individual and ψ
(S,I)
l,k reflects the effect of
trait k in the focal individual on trait l in the social partner. In the indirect218
genetic effect literature, Ψ(I,S) is often simply denoted as Ψ (Moore et al., 1997).
220
In the above examples there is either no social partner or one social partner.
It might be imagined that in maternal effect models there is only one social222
partner (the mother) but because the individual’s trait values and/or fitness
are affected by maternal traits, which in turn may be affected by grandmaternal224
traits, and so on, there may in fact be an infinite number of social partners. In
this instance we will, with some abuse of the notation, use Ψ(I,S) to denote the226
effect of the mother’s traits on her offspring’s traits. This matrix is denoted M
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in Kirkpatrick & Lande (1989) and ψ
(I,S)
l,k is the effect of the k
th trait in the228
mother on the lth trait in the offspring. If trait values are ordered by generation,
with the individual’s (offspring) generation first then the maternal generation,230
grand-maternal generation, and so on, the K-L model can be represented by the
infinite matrix:232
Ψ =

0 Ψ(I,S) 0 0 . . .
0 0 Ψ(I,S) 0 . . .
0 0 0 Ψ(I,S) . . .
0 0 0 0 . . .
...
...
...
...
. . .

(9)
Ko¨lliker et al. (2005) allow offspring traits to effect maternal traits and de-
note the matrix Ψ(S,I) as O. This would add a subdiagonal to Ψ.234
If we denote the vector of trait values z, breeding values a and environmental236
values e for the focal partner followed by its social partners then:
z = a + Ψz + e (10)
This equation can be rearranged (Gianola & Sorensen (2004); see Hadfield238
et al. (2011) for an application to IGE models):
(I−Ψ)z = a + e (11)
such that we can have Λ = I−Ψ and z˜ = a+e. The matrix Λ is sometimes240
referred to as the Jacobian and can be interpreted in terms of partial derivatives:
Λ =
∂z˜
∂z
(12)
Consequently,242
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βz˜ = Λ
−>βz =
∂z
∂z˜
∂w
∂z
=
∂w
∂z˜
(13)
and we can view the selection gradient βz˜ as measuring the effect on fitness
if we perturb the inputs (z˜) into the system. To make the distinction between244
βz and βz˜ clear, a hypothetical two-trait system with a single social partner is
illustrated in Figure 1. The causal paths by which z and z˜ respectively affect246
the fitness of the focal individual are highlighted.
Figure 1 here248
Deriving the equation for evolutionary change gets a little complicated when
the trait values of the individual are correlated with the number of individuals250
for which they are the social partner. In what follows we will assume that a)
the covariance between trait value and group size is constant across generations252
and b) that if the covariance is non-zero then variation in group size is small.
Assuming them to be met, two key relationships emerge:254
COV(a(I), z˜>) = COV(a(I), z>Λ>)
= (G r1G . . . rnG)
(14)
where rm is the relatedness between the individual and the m
th of n social
partners. This equation tells us that the covariance between breeding values256
of one individual and the transformed traits of another are equal to rG. The
change in phenotype is:258
∆z(I) =
(
Λ−1∆a
)(I) (15)
When focal and social partners belong to the same generation then ∆a(I) =
∆a(S) and in the examples given above Equation 15 reduces to:260
∆z(I) =
(
I−Ψ(I) −Ψ(I,S))−1 ∆a(I) (16)
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In maternal effect models ∆a(I) and ∆a(S) may differ because they refer to
different generations. In deriving Equation 16 when social partners belong to262
different generations we therefore have to also assume c) that there has been a
constant force of selection, and as a consequence a constant response to that se-264
lection. Note that in maternal effect models assumption a) implies assumption
c) because in these models group size (the number of offspring) and fitness are266
equivalent (Hadfield, 2012).
268
4) Non-social selection and evolution
In the non-social example - where only the individual’s own traits affect270
each other - the transform Λ = I − Ψ results in selection gradients that are
equivalent to the path-analytic selection gradients obtained by Arnold (1983).272
By combining Equations 4, 14 and 16 the change in mean phenotype is:
∆z(I) = Λ−1Gβz˜ (17)
which was obtained by Morrissey (2014) (where G was denoted as G).274
If we include fitness in the traits under selection such that z =
[
w(I), z>(I), z>(S)
]>
276
then clearly the first element of βz is one and the rest are zero. If we explicitly
state that there is then no direct path between the original traits and fitness278
(i.e. the first row of Ψ is all zeros), then:
βz˜ = Λ
−>βz
=
 1 0
0 I−Ψ/w
−>  1
0

=
 1
0

(18)
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where Ψ/w is the coefficient matrix for the original traits (i.e. z excluding280
fitness). This gives
∆a(I) = COV (a(I), z˜>)βz˜
= COV (a(I), w(I))
(19)
which is Robertson’s (1966) covariance (the Price (1970) equation applied282
to breeding values and without transmission bias (Frank, 1997)). This covari-
ance forms the basis of genetical theories of selection (Gardner et al., 2011) but284
since it can be derived by explicitly stating that the traits have no causal effect
on fitness, such theories are perhaps better described as genetical-correlational286
theories because the breeding values of traits may just happen to be correlated
with fitness. Although ugly, we retain the term genetical-correlational so that288
in the discussion we can distinguish such theories from genetic approaches to
measuring selection that are based on the idea of a causal effect.290
5) Social selection and evolution292
In the presence of social partners we can partition the non-transformed se-
lection gradient into elements associated with the individual’s own traits (non-294
social selection) and elements associated with the social partners’ traits (social
selection) (Wolf et al. (1999); these two types of selection have also been called296
direct and parental selection respectively; Kirkpatrick & Lande (1989); Hadfield
(2012)):298
βz =
 β(I)
β(S)
 (20)
By applying the Λ = I−Ψ transform we get:
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βz˜ =
 (I−Ψ>(I) −Ψ>(S,I)(I−Ψ>(S))−1Ψ>(I,S))−1 (β(I) + Ψ>(S,I)(I−Ψ>(S))−1β(S))(
I−Ψ>(S) −Ψ>(I,S)(I−Ψ>(I))−1Ψ>(S,I))−1 (β(S) + Ψ>(I,S)(I−Ψ>(I))−1β(I))

(21)
The first subvector of βz˜ is the causal effect of an individual’s own z˜ traits300
on fitness. To be consistent with a cost (a negative effect on fitness) we will
denote this vector as −βC . The second subvector is the causal effect of the302
social partners’ z˜ traits on the focal individual’s fitness and we will denote this
βB . We propose that βC and βB represent vector-valued costs and benefits304
according to Hamilton’s definition, and the definition by which they are most
widely understood.306
With one social partner the change in trait breeding values is then:308
∆a(I) = COV(a(I), z˜>)βz˜
= [G rG]
 −βC
βB

= G [rβB − βC ]
(22)
or more generally:
∆a(I) = G [r1βB1 + r2βB2 + . . . rnβBn − βC ] (23)
where βBm is the subvector of βB relating to the m
th (of n) social partners.310
Cost/Benefits in maternal effect models.
In the context of maternal effects rm = 1/2
m, because relatedness drops312
geometrically with lineal ancestry, and Equation 23 has a form similar to that
derived in other cross-generational models (Lehmann, 2007). If we assume βz314
is only non-zero for the traits of the individual and the mother (i.e. there
are no direct effects of more distant ancestors, such as grandmothers, on the316
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individual’s fitness) and there are no within individual effects of traits on each
other (i.e. Ψ(I) = 0) then:318
βC = −βI (24)
and
βBm = Ψ
(m−1)>(I,S)
(
β(S) + Ψ>(I,S)β(I)
)
(25)
which represents the mth maternal ancestors effect on the individual’s fit-320
ness. Depending on the presence of ‘cascading’ maternal effects (McGlothlin &
Galloway (2014); see Figure 2 for a definition) and the pattern of social selection322
this equation can be simplified (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 here324
Under the maternal performance model envisaged in Cheverud (1984) there
are two traits; trait 1 is maternal performance and positively affects trait 2 in326
the offspring, which increases the offspring’s fitness. There is no social selection,
β(S) = 0, and there are no cascading maternal effects since Ψ>(I,S) is a 2-by-2328
null matrix except for the entry ψ2,1. In the absence of cascading maternal
effects Ψm>(I,S)=0 when m > 1, so that330
βB1 = Ψ
>(I,S)β(I)
=
 ψ2,1βI,2
0
 (26)
and there are no benefits beyond the mother. Cheverud (1984) equated βI,2
with the benefit but Hadfield (2012) suggested that ψ2,1βI,2, as given here, is332
more appropriate as it represents the effect trait 1 in the mother has on her
offspring’s fitness.334
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Cheverud (1984) noted that genetic correlations between traits would alter
the expected direction of evolutionary change than that implied by Hamilton’s336
rule, and that maternal performance would only increase if:
βC,1
βB,1
>
(
g2,1
g1,1
+
1
2
)
(27)
where the benefit and cost of maternal performance are βB,1 = ψ2,1βI,2338
and βC,1 = −βI,1 respectively. Hadfield (2012) incorrectly interpreted the RHS
of Equation 27 as a form of relatedness, not realising it was a function of the340
non-selection terms in Equations 14 and 16 (i.e. (I−Ψ(I,S))−1[G rG] where
r = 1/2).342
Cost/benefits in a symmetric 2-player game.344
McGlothlin et al. (2010) simply equated βI with the cost and βS with the
benefit of Hamilton’s rule. This was criticised by Hadfield (2012) because it346
fails to include in the benefit the effect a social partner might have on the
recipients fitness via their effect on the recipients phenotype. For example, in348
the context of the Cheverud (1984) model, βS,1 = 0 because there is no direct
link between parental performance and offspring fitness and so no benefits would350
be identified. This contrasts with the benefit as given above, which is a function
of the non-social selection gradient βI,2.352
More recently McGlothlin et al. (2014) derived several alternative definitions
of cost and benefit in IGE models, and made the distinction between their354
original cost and benefit (which they refer to as ‘phenotypic’; McGlothlin et al.,
2010) and an alternative definition of cost and benefit which they refer to as356
‘genetic’ after Queller (1992). McGlothlin et al. (2014) only consider single trait
models, but the multitrait equivalent of their two-player symmetric model has358
Ψ(S,I) = Ψ(I,S) and Ψ(I) = Ψ(S) = 0, which gives:
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βC = −
(
I−Ψ>(I,S)Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
(β(I) + Ψ>(I,S)β(S)) (28)
βB =
(
I−Ψ>(I,S)Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
(β(S) + Ψ>(I,S)β(I)) (29)
McGlothlin et al.’s (2014) ‘genetic’ selection gradients have the form:360
βCM = −
(
I−Ψ>(I,S))βC (30)
and
βBM =
(
I−Ψ>(I,S))βB (31)
We can view our cost and benefit as the change in the actors and recip-362
ients fitness if we perturb an individual’s z˜ trait (or breeding value) by one
unit, whereas McGlothlin’s (2014) cost and benefit is the change in the ac-364
tors and recipients fitness if we perturb an individual’s total breeding value
((I−Ψ>(I,S))−1a(I); Moore et al. (1997)) by one unit.366
In Figure 3 we summarise sections 4) and 5) by showing the different as-368
sumptions that various models make about the causal effect of traits on fitness.
Figure 3 here370
6) Hamilton’s rule and the evolution of inclusive fitness
In the single trait case an altruistic trait will increase if (in the single social372
partner case):
0 < g [rβB − βC ]
βC < rβB
(32)
and this is well understood. However, it should be noted that in the general374
multivariate case this does not imply that if the benefit times relatedness exceeds
17
the cost for a particular trait, the trait will evolve more altruistic values. For376
example, imagine a trait that has no effect on the bearer’s direct fitness but
reduces the fitness of its related social partners a little. In the univariate case378
such a trait would not evolve. However, if this trait was positively genetically
correlated with another trait that had no effect on the social partners fitness but380
increased its bearer’s fitness tremendously, then the first trait would increase
because of the correlated response to selection the second trait exerts. In Figure382
4 we illustrate this idea with another example.
Figure 4 here384
Although it is clear that in a multivariate context the evolution of individual
traits cannot be understood in terms of Hamilton’s rule, it is unclear whether386
the evolution of the system as a whole can be understood in such terms. Will
a more costly system evolve if the relative increase in the benefit is greater388
than relatedness? To obtain an answer, note that the elements of the selection
vectors represent the decrease in the fitness of the actor (βC) and the increase390
in the fitness of the recipient (βB) if each z˜ trait is increased by one unit. The
elements of ∆a represent the amount of evolutionary change for each z˜ trait,392
and so β>C∆a is the total decrease in the actors fitness caused by evolutionary
change in all traits and β>B∆a is the total increase in the recipients fitness.394
Consequently, to find the conditions for altruism to evolve we need to find the
conditions under which both these quantities increase. This can be achieved by396
having β∗B = β
>
BG
1/2 and β∗C = β
>
CG
1/2 where G1/2 is the unique non-negative
square-root of G and the new selection vectors are in units of generalized genetic398
distance (Lande, 1979). The traits will then evolve so that the recipients fitness
increases when:400
||β∗C || · cos(θ) < r · ||β∗B || (33)
where θ is the angle between β∗B and β
∗
C . The LHS is the scalar projection
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of the cost vector onto the benefit vector, with both evaluated in units of gen-402
eralised genetic distances. Likewise, we can obtain the conditions under which
the system will evolve to be more costly to actors:404
||β∗C || < r · ||β∗B || · cos(θ) (34)
where the RHS is the scalar projection of the benefit vector onto the cost
vector multiplied by r. If we only consider situations where r is positive, this406
latter inequality cannot hold if cos(θ) < 0 and so θ must lie between 270◦ and
90◦. When θ = 0, cos(θ) = 1 and both inequalities have Hamilton’s form:408
||β∗C || < r · ||β∗B || (35)
Moreover, when θ = 0 the relative lengths of the two vectors remain the
same under a linear transformation, so that the inequality holds even when the410
vectors are in their original units:
||βC || < r · ||βB || (36)
This makes intuitive sense because when the two vectors are pointing in the412
same direction (θ = 0) the problem can be recast as a single trait problem,
albeit a trait that is some linear combination of the original traits. Although414
this scenario may seem unlikely, it is worth noting that when there is system-
level equilibrium (i.e. rβB − βC = 0) the two vectors must point in the same416
direction.
More generally, cos(θ) will lie between 0 and 1 and so for altruism to evolve418
relatedness must exceed the cost:benefit ratio by more than that in Hamilton’s
rule if ||β∗C || and ||β∗B || are equated with the cost and benefit. In Figure 5 and420
the discussion we explain why this is the case.
Figure 5 here422
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In Figure 6 we also provide a graphical depiction of the results in terms of
the vector projections.424
Figure 6 here
The results can be understood by noting that inclusive fitness is always426
increasing when G is non-singular and the system is not at equilibrium:
∆IF = [rβB − βC ]>∆a
= [rβB − βC ]>G [rβB − βC ]
> 0
(37)
Also, a transformation of the traits into units of genetic distance gives:428
∆IF = [rβ∗B − β∗C ]> [rβ∗B − β∗C ] (38)
such that evolution maximises the increase in inclusive fitness per unit of
generalised genetic distance. These two results are analogous to results for mul-430
tivariate evolution in the absence of social interactions (Lande, 1979), although
there fitness, rather than inclusive fitness, is maximised. When the system is432
not at equilibrium inclusive fitness will increase and so the traits evolve in a
way in which both the fitness of the actor and recipient may increase.434
Discussion436
In this paper we give the conditions under which altruism evolves when social438
interactions involve multiple traits. We show that the evolution of a single trait
within a multitrait system cannot be understood in terms of Hamilton’s rule440
(Hamilton, 1964b), but the evolution of the system can be understood in terms of
two Hamilton-like inequalities (Inequalities 33 and 34). The derivation involves442
transforming the selection gradients of quantitative genetics into Hamilton’s
costs and benefits, and unlike previous transforms (McGlothlin et al., 2014) the444
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transform we develop also holds in the context of indirect genetic effect models.
We acknowledge that a simpler genetical Hamilton’s rule (Gardner et al., 2011)446
can also be used to determine if altruism will evolve in such systems, but we
suggest that its simplicity means that it cannot be used to understand why448
altruism evolves.
When predicting whether altruism will evolve, the primary differences be-450
tween our results and those of Hamilton (1964b) are a) two inequalities have to
be satisfied rather than one, b) relatedness may have to exceed the cost:benefit452
ratio by a substantial amount, depending on how vector-valued costs and ben-
efits are summarised as scalars, and c) genetic architecture plays a non-trivial454
role in determining whether the inequalities are satisfied. We discuss each of
these in turn.456
Point a) can be dealt with simply as Hamilton’s rule actually consists of two
rules: the familiar inequality, rb > c, but also the implicit condition that b and458
c are the same sign. Otherwise, rb > c would be satisfied if mutualism rather
than altruism evolved: if b was positive but c negative (a benefit to the actor).460
Our second inequality (Inequality 34) plays the role of ensuring c has the same
sign as b, but in a multivariate context. In a single trait analysis the angle462
between b and c would be 180◦ if they had different signs, and so inequality 34
could never be satisfied (because cos(θ) = −1).464
In Hamilton’s work only a single trait is considered and so the cost and
benefit can be represented by scalars. When multiple traits are involved it is466
most natural to consider the costs and benefits as vector-valued, with a cost and
benefit associated with each trait. However, we show that scalar properties of468
the cost and benefit vectors (their lengths) or scalar comparisons of the cost and
benefit vectors (scalar projections) can be used to obtain inequalities similar470
in form to those derived by Hamilton. For simplicity, we first consider these
inequalities in the absence of genetic constraints (the genetic variance is the472
same in all directions) in order to address point b). Using scalar comparisons
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comes closest to Hamilton’s simple rule, where r > c : b (from Inequality 33) is474
the condition under which the traits will evolve to be beneficial to the recipients.
Here, c : b designates the cost projected onto the benefit vector divided by the476
length of the benefit vector, which for single traits is simply c/b. However, we
find our results easier to interpret when we associate the absolute costs and478
benefits with their respective vector lengths. When the the cost and benefit
vectors are in the same direction, the combination of traits that increases the480
recipients fitness is the same combination that decreases the actors fitness. In
this situation we can think about this combination as a new composite trait482
which obeys Hamilton’s single trait rule. If the cost and r-weighted benefit
vectors have the same length these two forces cancel and the traits will not evolve484
(Figure 5A), but if the length of the r-weighted benefit vector is increased the
traits will evolve in a direction that increases the recipients fitness (Figure 5B).486
If the two vectors are not in the same direction then the two vectors can never
cancel each other out in all directions, and so (some) traits are guaranteed488
to evolve. Just as Lande’s (1979) multitrait generalisation of the breeder’s
equation showed that trait values will always change in a way that increases490
mean fitness, we show that, in a social context, traits will always change in
a way that increases inclusive fitness. This implies that if the vectors are in492
different directions inclusive fitness will increase, and if the vectors have the
same length then this increase in inclusive fitness will be shared between the494
actor and the recipient in the ratio 1 : r (Figure 5D). Such a situation is not
altruistic but mutualistic, because both parties fitness will increase. To shift496
the ratio so that all of the increase in inclusive fitness falls to the recipients
would require the length of the r-weighted benefit vector to exceed that of the498
cost vector (Figure 5F), potentially by an amount much larger than Hamilton’s
single trait rule suggests. As the angle between the two vectors increases the500
potential for evolution to benefit both parties increases, and so the relatedness
required for altruism, rather than mutualism, to evolve becomes larger. Once502
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the angle becomes obtuse, the traits will always evolve to benefit both parties,
and altruism cannot evolve (Figure 5C).504
Regarding point c) our results also have a close affinity with the Lande
(1979) Equation which demonstrated that the evolution of a single trait cannot506
be understood without understanding the selection that operates on genetically
correlated characters. In this sense Hamilton’s single trait rule is also known to508
fail (Cheverud, 1984) in an easily understood way: a character may evolve to
harm relatives even when it has no impact on the actor’s fitness if the trait is510
genetically correlated with a character that increases the actor’s fitness. How-
ever, a possible way to salvage Hamilton’s rule in this situation is to argue that512
the evolution of the second character constitutes a negative cost (a benefit to
the actor) and it is this that allows the first character to evolve in a way that514
constitutes a negative benefit (a cost to the recipient). This argument is identi-
cal to that described above where we need to think about the cost and benefit516
provided by a suite of traits and show that the system as a whole evolves to be
more altruistic when rb exceeds c. Above we showed that this argument does518
not hold even in the absence of genetic constraints when the cost and benefit
are associated with vector lengths. However, if we think about the cost:benefit520
ratio in terms of scalar projections then in the absence of genetic constraints
the condition for altruism does appear to be r > c : b. However, in the presence522
of genetic constraints the inequality is actually r > c∗ : b∗ where the vector
elements do not correspond to the original traits, but weighted combinations524
of traits for which genetic constraints have been removed. Although working
in generalised genetic distances allows for a nice compact formula, it should526
be understood that this compactness comes at the cost of hiding the genetic
constraints. In reality, genetic constraints will disrupt the simple relationship528
r > c : b and for altruism to evolve r may have to be much larger than c : b
if there is much less genetic variance in the direction of the benefit vector than530
the cost vector. Alternatively, the conditions for altruism to evolve may be less
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restrictive if the genetic variance in the direction of the benefit vector is greater532
than that in the direction of the cost vector. The amount of genetic variance in
each direction will depend on the exact patterns of genetic (co)variance between534
the traits. A notable exception to this is when the cost and benefit vector are
in the same direction. Then, the genetic variance along each vector has to be536
the same (they can be thought of as the same composite trait) and r > c : b
will hold. At equilibrium the two vectors must be in the same direction and so538
at equilibrium the inequalities we present collapse to those of Hamilton’s rule,
irrespective of genetic architecture, and irrespective of how we choose to define540
or compare costs and benefits.
542
We obtained the results outlined above by finding a relationship between
the selection gradients from quantitative genetics and the costs and benefits in544
Hamilton’s rule. Previous attempts at finding a correspondence have mainly
been done in the context of indirect genetic effect (IGE) models (Cheverud,546
1984; McGlothlin et al., 2010; Hadfield, 2012; McGlothlin et al., 2014) whereby
an individual may affect both the phenotype and the fitness of its social part-548
ner (Moore et al., 1997; Wolf et al., 1999). Although several general trans-
forms have been suggested (McGlothlin et al., 2014) our transform differs from550
those proposed earlier. Our transform is based on a causal description of
how a change in an individual’s trait value affects the individuals own fitness552
(cost) and the fitness of its social partners (benefit). In indirect genetic ef-
fect models, where multiple individuals affect each others’ trait values and fit-554
ness, there are multiple ways we can assign cause. Imagine the causal graph{
k(S) → w(I); k(S) → l(I) → w(I)} where trait k in the social partner affects556
the fitness of the focal individual by two routes; directly, but also indirectly
through its affect on trait l of the focal individual. In a non-social context,558
the multiple regression approach (Lande, 1979; Lande & Arnold, 1983) captures
selection on k through its direct effect, whereas the path-analytic approach560
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(Arnold, 1983; Conner, 1996; Morrissey, 2014) captures selection on k through
both paths. In the context of IGE models, both types of causal assignment have562
been implicitly used, and attempts have been made to relate the resulting se-
lection parameters to Hamilton’s cost and benefit (McGlothlin et al., 2014). In564
this paper we suggest that all of the ways, direct and indirect, in which a social
partner can can affect the fitness of a focal individual should be considered as566
the benefit in Hamilton’s rule (Hadfield, 2012). We believe this to be consistent
with how Hamilton’s costs and benefits are typically interpreted, and also leads568
us to an inequality that is pleasingly similar to that of Hamilton’s. However, we
should stress that we are not criticising the utility of previous transforms (Mc-570
Glothlin et al., 2014) only that they are hard to reconcile with Hamilton’s costs
and benefits. Indeed, from an empirical perspective the transform presented in572
McGlothlin et al. (2010) is a more tractable way of measuring selection because
the fitness of an individual can be regressed on observable traits (z). The z˜574
traits we introduced for mathematical convenience are not directly observable
and quantifying selection on them not only involves measuring fitness and the576
observable traits, but how the observable traits influence each others expression.
Although our inequality is similar to Hamilton’s it is not identical and this578
appears to deny the claim that Hamilton’s rule has general validity (Gardner
et al., 2011). However, it is a genetical Hamilton’s rule for which claims of580
generality have been made rather than a phenotype-based approach we take
here. From a causal perspective we show that taking a genetical view is tanta-582
mount to assuming that the cause of fitness variation is fitness itself, and that
selection is simply viewed as an association between breeding value and fitness584
irrespective of whether that association is correlational or causal. The genet-
ical view hides complications such as selection on genetically correlated traits586
and indirect genetic effects (Gardner et al., 2011) and although this results in
generality and simplicity it does so, we believe, at the cost of obscuring the588
underlying biology that is of interest to many biologists, particularly empiri-
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cists. Consequently, we echo Okasha’s (2016) statement made in the context of590
kin and multi-level selection that ‘ideally we want a description of evolution to
provide insight into the causal factors responsible for the evolutionary change in592
question, in addition to computing the correct answer ’. However, we must stress
that the genetical approach that we criticise is one in which the breeding values594
of a single trait are treated as the object under selection, without consideration
of the other traits that may determine the fitness of the actor and/or the re-596
cipient. We have called such an approach genetical-correlational to distinguish
it from genetic approaches to measuring selection that do attempt to identify598
causal relationships. For example, when the breeding values of all traits are
considered, then the partial derivative/regression coefficients of fitness on the600
breeding values are identical to those on phenotypes (Rausher, 1992; Queller,
1992) and this multitrait genetic approach (Stinchcombe et al., 2014) can result602
in the same decomposition as our causal approach. This equivalence is compat-
ible with the idea that genotypes have a causal effect on fitness via phenotypes.604
The genetical-correlational approach is not compatible with this idea because
the genes that determine the focal trait may simply be in linkage disequilbiria606
with genes that determine another fitness related trait that has been ignored.
In the context of the multitrait genetic approach we invoked the causal608
relationship, genotype to phenotype to fitness. However, the theory developed
here is not in terms of genotypes but breeding values - the genetic aspect of610
the phenotype which is at the center of most quantitative genetic theories of
evolution. The breeding value is not only a function of an individual’s genotype,612
but also the allele frequencies and linkage disequilibria in the population and the
other genotypic values that might exist there (Falconer, 1983). It is then hard614
to imagine that such a function has a causal effect on fitness in any common
sense way: the difference in fitness caused by two different genotypes would616
change depending on the genotypic composition of the population they were
in, even in the absence of any intraspecific interactions. However, it should be618
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remembered that the effect of a perturbation in a non-linear system will depend
on its current state, and so when we describe a causal effect in such systems620
it makes sense to to talk about the average effect of a perturbation. This idea
is central to the general definition of a selection gradients as E[∂w/∂z] where622
the average is taken over individuals. In the linear systems discussed in this
paper the effect on fitness of perturbing traits is constant over individuals so624
we simply use the shorthand ∂w/∂z. Fisher (1958) attached a causal meaning
to the average effect (of a gene substitution) and although the validity of this626
interpretation has been questioned (Falconer, 1985), Lee & Chow (2013) show
that if the causal effect is averaged in a specific way then we can retain the idea628
that breeding values represent the average causal effect of alleles on phenotypes
(Okasha & Martens, 2016).630
This work is theoretical and we have imposed a causal relationship between
traits, and between traits and fitness. Inferring causality from correlational data632
is fraught with well known problems, and we suggest that to understand selec-
tion from a causal perspective, more experiments are required (Grafen, 1988;634
Morrissey, 2014). Although the type of traits that can be experimentally ma-
nipulated is limited, there has been a long history of such experiments (e.g.636
Andersson, 1982) that have not been well integrated into the general literature
on natural selection (Kingsolver et al., 2001). In a social context this is ex-638
acerbated by the use of incorrect fitness measures which further confound the
causal notion of selection with the correlational aspect of inheritance (Grafen,640
1982; Wolf & Wade, 2001; Thomson & Hadfield, 2017). We hope this work
encourages people to focus on natural and kin selection as causes of fitness vari-642
ation, and the consequences this has for understanding the evolutionary process.
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Figure 1: Schematic showing how the fitness and the values of two traits (k and
l) in individual I are determined by its own trait values and that of its social
partner S. A) Models of evolutionary change such as the Lande Equation and
the K-L model define selection as ∂w/∂z where the hypothetical experiment
would involve perturbing one element of z holding all other elements constant.
The different arrow colours represent the different paths by which each trait
affects fitness. Under this scenario k(S) has no causal effect on the focal in-
dividual’s fitness because there is no direct link between k(S) and w(I). B)
Alternatively we can think of selection as ∂w/∂z˜. Here k˜(S) affects the focal
individual’s fitness because it affects the expression of l(S) and l(I) (directly)
and k(I) (indirectly) all of which affect the focal individual’s fitness. The multi-
coloured lines represent the fact that multiple traits can have an affect through
the same path.
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Figure 2: Schematic showing how the fitness and the values of two traits (k and
l) in individual I are determined by its own trait values and that of its social
partners (its mother S1, its grandmother S2 and its great grandmother S3). In
the upper figure, trait l maternally affects itself and so the maternal effects are
‘cascading’. With cascading maternal effects, the phenotypes of all maternal an-
cestors (dark blue+red) affect the traits of the individual (light blue+red) and
this can also occur when a trait indirectly affects itself maternally (for example
if l maternally affects k and k maternally affects l). In the middle figure there
are no cascading maternal effects (ψ
(I,S)
l,l = 0) and only maternal and grand-
maternal traits have an impact on the offspring trait values and fitness. The
grandmaternal trait has an impact because trait k in the grandmother affects
trait l in the mother which affects offspring fitness. In the lower figure there is no
direct link between the maternally affected trait (l) and offspring fitness (i.e. no
social selection on trait l) and there are no cascading maternal effects. These are
the assumptions of Cheverud’s (1984) extension of the Willham (1972) model,
and there is no causal impact of traits expressed in relatives more distant than
the mother on offspring trait values or fitness.
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w(I) w(I)
k˜(I) k(I)
l˜(I) l(I)
k˜(S) k(S)
l˜(S) l(S)
Figure 3: Schematic showing how the fitness and the values of two traits (k and
l) in individual I are determined by its own trait values and that of its social
partner S. Models of evolutionary change partition the causal graph into a
part that causes fitness variation and a part that generates covariances between
traits. Different models make different partitions, which are equally valid and
merely reflect the researchers interests. The different colours reflect the traits
at which different partitions are made under different models; green: Robertson
(1966); Price (1970), light blue: Lande (1979), light red: Arnold (1983); Mor-
rissey (2014), light+dark red: Equation 21. Paths downstream of the partition
determine selection, and paths upstream determine the trait (co)variances. The
partition used by Kirkpatrick & Lande (1989) and McGlothlin et al. (2010) dif-
fers in that the partition is not defined by a set of traits and is represented by
light+dark blue arrows; the partition separates the two arrows downstream of
l(S).
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(A)
−βC
rβB
∆a
(B)
−βC
rβB
∆a
Figure 4: Diagrams depicting the benefit vector to the actor (the negative cost
-βC) and relatedness-weighted benefit to the recipient (rβB), together with the
response to selection (∆a). The two selection vectors are equal for the trait on
the y-axis, but the relatedness-weighted benefit exceeds the cost for the trait on
the x-axis. In both cases the system of traits evolves so that the recipients fitness
increases at a cost to the actor. This is represented by the projections of the
response to selection vector on the r-weighted benefit vector (blue) and the cost
vector (red). The blue vector is in the same direction as the benefit vector but
the red vector is in the opposite direction to the cost. A) The genetic variances
for each trait are equal and there is no genetic correlation (G is represented by
the circle). There is no response to selection on the y-axis because Hamilton’s
inequality is satisfied (rβB,y = βC,y). B) The genetic variances for each trait
are equal but there is a genetic correlation of -0.5 between the traits (G is
represented by the ellipse). The response to selection is deflected towards the
direction in trait space with the greatest genetic variance (the major axis of
the ellipse) and the trait on the y-axis evolves so that it harms recipients and
benefits actors despite rβB,y = βC,y.
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−β∗C
rβ∗B
(A)
−β∗C
rβ∗B
∆a
(B)
−β∗C
rβ∗B
∆a
(C)
−β∗C
rβ∗B
∆a
(D)
−β∗C
rβ∗B
∆a
(E)
−β∗C
rβ∗B
∆a
(F)
Figure 5: Diagrams depicting the benefit vector to the actor (the negative cost
-β∗C) and relatedness-weighted benefit to the recipient (rβ
∗
B), together with
the response to selection (∆a). The axes are in generalised genetic distances,
or alternatively G is an identity matrix. The response to selection projected
on the benefit vector to the actor and the r-weighted benefit vector to the
recipient are in red and blue respectively. When the projections are in the same
direction as the selection vectors, evolutionary change increases the fitness of
the recipient and the actor respectively. A) The angle between and β∗C and β
∗
B
is θ = 0 and they have the same length ||β∗C || = ||rβ∗B ||. As in Hamilton’s rule
there is no evolutionary change. B) increasing the benefit and/or relatedness
causes evolutionary change in the traits that increases the recipients fitness
at a cost to the actor. C) the angle between β∗C and β
∗
B is 160
◦. In this
case evolutionary change caused by one component of inclusive fitness always
moves the traits in a direction that increases inclusive fitness through the other
component. Under this scenario it is not possible for the system to evolve so
that it benefits recipients at a cost to actors. D) the selection vectors are of
the same length but the angle is 25◦ and lies between 270◦ and 90◦. The two
components of inclusive fitness increase equally as the traits evolve such that
no party bears a cost. E) Increasing the length of rβB beyond that which is
required for Hamilton’s univariate inequality to be satisfied causes the traits to
evolve in a way that preferentially benefits the recipients. However, in this case
both parties still benefit although the recipients benefit more than the actors.
F) Increasing the length of rβB even more, the traits evolve in a way that
further benefits recipients and actually causes a cost to the actors. The Hamilton
inequalities for a multivariate system are satisfied: ||β∗C || · cos(θ) < r · ||β∗B || and
||β∗C || < r · ||β∗B || · cos(θ).
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-β∗C
rβ∗B
(A)
-β∗C
rβ∗B
(B)
−β∗C
rβ∗B
(C)
−β∗C
rβ∗B
(D)
−β∗C
rβ∗B
(E)
−β∗C
rβ∗B
(F)
Figure 6: Diagrams depicting the benefit vector to the actor (the negative cost
-β∗C) and relatedness-weighted benefit to the recipient (rβ
∗
B). The axes are in
generalised genetic distances, or alternatively G is an identity matrix. The cost
vector projected onto the r-weighted benefit vector (||β∗C || · cos(θ)) is in red and
the r-weighted benefit vector projected onto the cost vector (r · ||β∗B || · cos(θ))
is in blue. When the projected cost is less than the r-weighted benefit the red
arrow falls short of rβ∗B and inequality 33 is satisfied. When the projected r-
weighted benefit is greater than the cost, the blue arrow falls beyond −β∗C and
inequality 34 is satisfied. The cost and benefit vectors are those in Figure 5
and panels B) and F) depict a scenario where trait values evolve to be more
altruisitic and both inequalities are satisfied: ||β∗C || · cos(θ) < r · ||β∗B || and
||β∗C || < r · ||β∗B || · cos(θ).
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Appendix782
Here we provide the derivation for the less intuitive results. First it will be
useful to show that the inverse of Λ can be expressed in three ways. Two are784
general, with
Λ−1 =
 I−Ψ(I) −Ψ(I,S)
−Ψ(S,I) I−Ψ(S)
−1
=
 S−(S) S−(S)Ψ(I,S)(I−Ψ(S,S))−1
S−(I)Ψ(S,I)(I−Ψ(I,I))−1 S−(I)
 (39)
and786
Λ−1 =
 S−(S) (I−Ψ(I,I))−1Ψ(I,S)S−(I)
(I−Ψ(S,S))−1Ψ(S,I)S−(S) S−(I)
 (40)
where
S(S) = I−Ψ(I) −Ψ(I,S)(I−Ψ(S))−1Ψ(S,I) (41)
is the Schur complement for Λ(S) and788
S(I) = I−Ψ(S) −Ψ(S,I)(I−Ψ(I))−1Ψ(I,S) (42)
is the Schur complement for Λ(I). The final way is specific to the maternal
effect model, since Ψ (Equation 9) has a 1st order vector autoregressive form790
(Lu¨tkepohl, 2005) so Λ has inverse
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Λ−1 =

I Ψ(I,S) Ψ2(I,S) Ψ3(I,S) . . . Ψn(I,S)
0 I Ψ(I,S) Ψ2(I,S) . . . Ψn(I,S)
0 0 I Ψ(I,S) . . . Ψ(n−1)(I,S)
0 0 0 I . . . Ψ(n−2)(I,S)
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 0 . . . I

(43)
We need to show that in the three examples given, the change in trait means792
given in Equation 15 reduces to that in equation 16 when it is assumed that
∆a(I) = ∆a(S). Using the inverse in Equation 39, the change in trait means is794
obtained as:
∆z(I) =
(
Λ−1∆a
)(I)
S−(S)∆a(I) + S−(S)Ψ(I,S)(I−Ψ(S,S))−1∆a(S)
(44)
so that when ∆a(I) = ∆a(S):796
∆z(I) = S−(S)∆a(I) + S−(S)Ψ(I,S)(I−Ψ(S,S))−1∆a(I)
= S−(S)
(
I + Ψ(I,S)(I−Ψ(S,S))−1)∆a(I) (45)
In the non-social example, Ψ(I,I) is non zero and there are no social partners,
hence798
∆z(I) = S−(S)∆a(I)
= (I−Ψ(I))−1∆a(I)
(46)
consistent with Equation 16. In the symmetric 2-player game, Ψ(I,I) =
Ψ(S,S) = 0 and Ψ(S,I) = Ψ(I,S) and so800
∆z(I) = S−(S)(I + Ψ(I,S))∆a(I)(
I−Ψ(I,S)Ψ(S,I))−1 (I + Ψ(I,S))∆a(I)
(I−Ψ(I,S))−1∆a(I)
(47)
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again, consistent with Equation 16. The above holds because,
(I−Ψ(I,S))−1 = (I−Ψ(I,S)Ψ(S,I))−1 (I + Ψ(I,S))
(I−Ψ(I,S))−1(I + Ψ(I,S))−1 = (I−Ψ(I,S)Ψ(S,I))−1(
(I + Ψ(I,S))(I−Ψ(I,S)))−1 = (I−Ψ(I,S)Ψ(S,I))−1(
I + Ψ(I,S) −Ψ(I,S) −Ψ(I,S)Ψ(I,S))−1 = (I−Ψ(I,S)Ψ(S,I))−1(
I−Ψ(I,S)Ψ(I,S))−1 = (I−Ψ(I,S)Ψ(S,I))−1
(48)
when Ψ(I,S) = Ψ(S,I). In the final, maternal effect case, it is easier to derive802
Equation 16 using the inverse form in Equation 43. Assuming that evolutionary
change in all generations has been equal to ∆a(I) then:804
∆z(I) =
(
Λ−1∆a
)(I)
=
∑n=∞
m=0 Ψ
m(I,S)∆a(I)
= (I−Ψ(I,S))−1∆a(I)
(49)
consistent with Equation 16. The final line is obtained since we are taking
the infinite sum of a geometric series.806
The derivation of cost and benefit vectors in Equation 21 can most easily be808
obtained using the inverse of Λ in the form presented in Equation 40:
βz˜ = Λ
−>βz
=
 S−(S) (I−Ψ(I,I))−1Ψ(I,S)S−(I)
(I−Ψ(S,S))−1Ψ(S,I)S−(S) S−(I)
>  β(I)
β(S)

=
 S−>(S) S−>(S)Ψ>(S,I)(I−Ψ>(S,S))−1
S−>(I)Ψ>(I,S)(I−Ψ>(I,I))−1 S−>(I)
 β(I)
β(S)

=
 S−>(S) (β(I) + Ψ>(S,I)(I−Ψ>(S,S))−1β(S))
S−>(I)
(
β(S) + Ψ>(I,S)(I−Ψ>(I,I))−1β(I))

(50)
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where expansion of the Schur complements gives Equation 21. In the sym-810
metric two-player game this simplifies to Equations 51 and 52:
βC = −
(
I−Ψ>(I,S)Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
(β(I) + Ψ>(I,S)β(S)) (51)
βB =
(
I−Ψ>(I,S)Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
(β(S) + Ψ>(I,S)β(I)) (52)
McGlothlin’s (2014) selection gradients are only given in univariate form812
without derivation, but we take the multivariate form to be:
βCM = (I + Ψ
>(I,S))−1(β(I) + Ψ>(I,S)β(S))
= −(I + Ψ>(I,S))−1 (I−Ψ>(I,S)Ψ>(I,S))βC
= −(I−Ψ>(I,S))βC
(53)
βBM = (I + Ψ
>(I,S))−1(β(S) + Ψ>(I,S)β(I))
= (I + Ψ>(I,S))−1
(
I−Ψ>(I,S)Ψ>(I,S))βB
= (I−Ψ>(I,S))βB
(54)
where in each case the final line can be obtained by taking the inverse of814
both sides of Equation 48 to show:
(I−Ψ(I,S)) = (I + Ψ(I,S))−1
(
I−Ψ(I,S)Ψ(S,I)
)
(55)
In the maternal effect model the inverse of Λ in the form presented in Equa-816
tion 43 allows a simpler derivation:
43
βz˜ = Λ
−>βz
=

I 0 0 0 . . . 0
Ψ>(I,S) I 0 0 . . . 0
Ψ2>(I,S) Ψ>(I,S) I 0 . . . 0
Ψ3>(I,S) Ψ2>(I,S) Ψ>(I,S) I . . . 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
Ψn>(I,S) Ψ(n−1)>(I,S) Ψ(n−2)>(I,S) Ψ(n−3)>(I,S) . . . I


β(I)
β(S)
0
0
...
0

=

β(I)
Ψ>(I,S)β(I) + β(S)
Ψ2>(I,S)β(I) + Ψ>(I,S)β(S)
Ψ3>(I,S)β(I) + Ψ2>(I,S)β(S)
...
Ψn>(I,S)β(I) + Ψ(n−1)>(I,S)β(S)

(56)
which gives Equations 24 and 25.818
Although not discussed in the main manuscript, here we consider an alter-820
native way to partition the causal graph in maternal effect models where only
downstream paths from the mother are considered as having a causal effect on822
offspring fitness. To achieve this we use the transform:
Λ =
 I −Ψ(I,S)
0 I
 Λ−1 =
 I Ψ(I,S)
0 I
 (57)
However, it is important to realise that because the transform does not824
capture the complete causal model defined by Equation 10 then Equation 14
does not hold. However, Kirkpatrick & Lande (1989) derived COV(a(I), z>):826
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COV(a(I), z>) =
[
G
(
I− 1
2
Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
1
2
G
(
I− 1
2
Ψ>(I,S)
)−1]
(58)
which gives
COV(a, z>)Λ> =
[
G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1 1
2G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1] I 0
−Ψ>(I,S) I

=
[
G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1 − 12G (I− 12Ψ>(I,S))−1 Ψ>(I,S) 12G (I− 12Ψ>(I,S))−1]
=
[
G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1 (
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)
1
2G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1]
=
[
G 12G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1]
(59)
such that the phenotypic effects of more distant maternal ancestors are con-828
sidered as responsible for building up a (non-standard) covariance between the
breeding values of the focal individual and the maternal phenotypes (the right830
hand partition of the above matrix). Under this scenario,
βz˜ = Λ
−>βz
=
 β(I)
β(S) + Ψ>(I,S)β(I)
 (60)
As an independent check,832
∆a(I) = GβC +
1
2G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
βB
= GβI +
1
2G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
Ψ>(I,S)β(I) + 12G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
β(S)
= 12G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1 (
2
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)
+ Ψ>(I,S)
)
β(I) + 12G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
β(S)
= G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
β(I) + 12G
(
I− 12Ψ>(I,S)
)−1
β(S)
(61)
as given in Kirkpatrick & Lande (1989).
834
In Equation 33 we derive the conditions under which a system of traits will
evolve so that they benefit recipients. The derivation makes use of the property836
45
a>b = cos(θ) · ||a|| · |b|| where ||a|| is the length of a and θ is the angle between
a and b:838
0 < β>B∆a
0 < β>BG [rβB − βC ]
0 < β>BGrβB − β>BGβC
0 < β>BG
1/2G1/2rβB − β>BG1/2G1/2βC
0 < r · ||β∗B || · ||β∗B || − ||β∗B || · ||β∗C || · cos(θ)
||β∗C || · cos(θ) < r · ||β∗B ||
(62)
In Equation 34 we derive the conditions under which a system of traits will
evolve so that they are costly to actors:840
0 < β>C∆a
0 < β>CG [rβB − βC ]
0 < β>CGrβB − β>CGβC
0 < β>CG
1/2G1/2rβB − β>CG1/2G1/2βC
0 < r · ||β∗C || · ||β∗B || · cos(θ)− ||β∗C || · ||β∗C ||
0 < r · ||β∗B || · cos(θ)− ||β∗C ||
||β∗C || < r · ||β∗B || · cos(θ)
(63)
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